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1. Introduction 
Wireless sensor-actuator systems (WSAS) have 
emerged as an important platform that enolble unprece-
dented levels of fine-grained visibility and control over 
our environment 11 -61. There are several smal l and inex-
pensive devices that are capable of capturing and process-
ing sensor inputs. In addition, the availability of protocols 
[7-101 and algorithms that address challenges. high fail-
ure-rales.limited resou rces and large-scale. allow us to de-
velop and deploy effective sensornets [11 - 141. In addition. 
there are several competing software platforms for pro-
gramm ing sensor network applications [15- 21]. 
Despite such advances. large-scale networks of sensors 
are incredibly hard to design and deploy. The time and ef-
fort required to design and implement software for such 
systems are not proportional to the size of the software it-
self: most of these applications are only a few hundreds of 
lines of source code. but take a disproportionate amount of 
time (several weeks. even months) to develop. An impor-
tant reason for this incongruity is that the set of design cri-
teria that developers must think about is quite different in 
the context of WSAS than in the context of enterprise sys-
tems. As opposed to internet-scale network applications. 
WSAS applications need to consider fault-tolerance as a 
pn'mClry design consideration. Failure is not the exception: 
it is the norm. This necessitates the designer of a WSAS 
application to include failure while she thinks about the 
functional behavior of the application. This causes the de-
sign space to be cluttered with functiona l requirements as 
well as fault-tolerance requ irements. 
In this paper. we argue that a reusable class of failure 
detectors can simplify the design and deployment of sen-
sornets. We focus on a class offailu res. i.e. loss of commu-
nication links between nodes. The hardware platforms that 
WSAS applications run on are inherently unreliable: the 
cost of producing each individual node is extremely low. 
and consequently. nodes are designed to be dispensable. 
This places a larger burden on someone designing applica-
tions that run on these platforms: applications running on 
such unreliable infrastructures must still function in a reli-
able manner. When a collection of nodes are unable to 
communicate. the WSAS is unlikely to provide an accept-
able level of service. To tolerate such failures. it is 
necessary to detect faults as and when they occur. Failure 
detection logic is typically included either directly in the 
application, or as part of a middleware service that pro­
vides neighborhood information. Neither of these cases is 
optimal. The former approach is tedious, error prone, and 
does not enable reuse of the failure detection logic. While 
the latter decouples the failure detection scheme from 
the application, the scheme is still tightly coupled to neigh­
bor discovery logic. The range of failures, and correspond­
ingly the range of failure detection mechanisms, cannot be 
effectively addressed in such tightly-coupled designs. We 
present a design that offers a higher degree of separation 
between independent concerns. 
Contributions. The contributions of this paper are: 
• A design for a failure detector that distinguishes 
between the failure of a communication link and mobil­
ity of a node in the WSAS. 
• A proof sketch to show that the above detector is 
correct. 
• Novel packaging of the above failure detector as a 
parameterizable middleware service for application 
designers. 
• Experimental results based on two different failure 
detection schemes designed using the middleware ser­
vice. These components were implemented in nesC 
[15] for the TinyOS [11] platform, and the experiments 
were conducted on a testbed of TelosB [13] motes. 
Paper organization. Following the background and re­
lated work discussion in Section 2, we present the first fail­
ure detector that can detect node failures in Section 3. In  
Section 4 we describe the second failure detector that suc­
cessfully detects failures in dynamic topologies, along with 
a proof of correctness, and a case study example to illus­
trate the use of the failure detector middleware. In Section 
5, we provide an evaluation of our failure detectors’ perfor­
mance using experiments conducted on an 80-node sensor 
network testbed. Finally, we conclude with a summary of 
the contributions and some directions for future work in 
Section 6. 
2. Background and related work 
2.1. Failure detection algorithms 
The use of unreliable failure detectors to implement reli­
able asynchronous distributed systems was first proposed 
by Chandra and Toueg [22]. The authors present four clas­
ses of failures and each class has different completeness 
and accuracy specifications. Since then, several other 
implementations of failure detectors have been reported 
in the literature [23–27]. 
All failure detectors work in roughly the following way. 
Each node maintains a list of its neighbors, and for each 
neighbor, the node keeps an account of whether it is per­
ceived to be alive or failed. Several strategies to solve this 
problem have been proposed. 
The simplest of these strategies involves nodes exchang­
ing heartbeat messages [23]. Each node periodically sends 
out an ‘‘I am alive” message to its neighbors. If a node p does 
not hear from some neighbor q for some specified length of 
time, p adds q to its suspect list. If, later on, p does receive a 
heartbeat from q, p realizes its mistake, and removes q from 
the suspect list. One way of ensuring that the same mistake 
is not made again, is to modify the timeout duration based 
on past mistakes. When p recovers from a mistake, it ex­
tends the timeout duration for q to be longer than the time 
it took for q’s heartbeat to arrive. For example, an adaptive 
timeout-based failure detector is reported in [28]. 
Instead of forcing every node to continually flood the 
network with heartbeat messages, some failure detectors 
follow an ‘‘on-demand” approach. When a process queries 
its failure detector module for the current suspect list, the 
failure detector sends an ‘‘Are you alive?” message to its 
neighbors. Following this, it waits for some specified time-
out period at the end of which it declares a neighbor to be a 
suspect if no response has been received. If, on the other 
hand, it receives an ‘‘I am alive” message, the neighbor is 
not added to the suspect list. The message complexity of 
this strategy is twice that of the heartbeat strategy, except 
that the number of times the detection cycle has to occur 
can be greatly reduced, thereby reducing the overall mes­
sage complexity of the failure detector module. Such 
ping-based implementations are reported in [24]. 
Unfortunately, none of these strategies are optimal for 
WSAS because here, the nodes sleep for most of the time, 
and are only awake for a few minutes at a time. In such a 
context, it makes sense to reverse the role of the messages. 
Each node p sends a message to its neighbors requesting a 
lease for some duration. A neighboring node q now records 
this lease, and assumes that p is alive for the lease dura­
tion. As long as p sends another lease request before its 
lease expires, q does not suspect p. But if the lease expires 
before p sends a request, then p is added to q’s suspect list. 
This strategy is described in [29], and is the strategy 
we use in this paper for local node failure detection in 
Section 3. 
Hutle and Widder [30] present two time-free self-stabi­
lizing algorithms for local failure detection for sparse net­
works. These algorithms apply equally well to dense 
networks. The first algorithm they propose requires un­
bounded amount of space in each process, and the second 
algorithm (the more realistic one) executes within 
bounded space when there is a known upper bound on 
the number of messages in the system. Their work, how­
ever, assumes a static topology and does not tolerate 
mobility of nodes. 
Fetzer and Högstedt [31] present a protocol for failure 
detection in partitionable systems. They consider systems 
in which a gateway node that connects a section of the net­
work to another section fails. This work uses the concept of 
software rejuvenation [32] – using a Rejuvenation Server 
to rejuvenate a gateway server if it is detected to be failed. 
Another approach to failure detection in partitionable net­
works is presented in [33], where Aguilera et al. use the 
heartbeat failure detector [23] to solve consensus in parti­
tionable networks. Their work does not consider mobility 
of nodes (link failures) and mistakes caused by mobility. 
However, these works on partitionable networks present 
some nice ideas that can be combined with the work pre­
sented in this paper to allow our mobility detectors accom­
modate network partitions as well. 
2.2. Failure detection in sensor networks 
In the recent past, there has been a considerable 
amount of work on developing abstractions for managing 
failures in sensor networks. Hood [34] is an abstraction 
that allows a node in a sensor network to easily access 
and interact with other nodes in its neighborhood. The 
Hood abstraction allows a node to easily share its local 
state with neighboring nodes. In addition to maintaining 
a list of one-hop neighbors, Hood also allows applications 
to create neighbor sets based on other attributes. The Hood 
abstraction can enhance the benefit of our failure detection 
components, since the application designer will then be 
able to define arbitrary neighborhoods. 
The Memento system [35] provides health monitoring 
services to wireless sensor network applications that are 
similar to our own. They focus exclusively on failures of 
immediately neighboring nodes, and failures caused by 
radio link irregularities. As part of the network manage­
ment system, Memento includes a local failure detection 
scheme that uses ping-and-response to monitor the health 
status of neighboring nodes. Our failure detection compo­
nents, particularly the Mobility Detector, can be used in 
place of this local failure detector to further improve the 
utility of Memento in tolerating both link irregularities 
and node mobility. 
Elhadef et al. [36,37] present a distributed diagnosis pro­
tocol for health management in mobile ad hoc networks. 
Their health management protocol, called dynamic-DSDP, 
is similar to ours in the sense that they also have a way of 
disseminating failure information from an initiator node 
to the rest of the network. The nodes organize themselves 
into a spanning tree of the graph, and send diagnostic infor­
mation about their local neighbors back to the root of the 
spanning tree. While the reason why nodes in our algo­
rithm share suspect information is for them to correct their 
local views, the purpose in their algorithm is to get a global 
view of failure information from across the network. 
2.3. Classes of failure detectors 
Of the four classes of failure detectors presented by 
Chandra and Toueg [22], the class of detectors we focus 
on is the eventually perfect ð}PÞ class. Failure detectors 
in this class satisfy the following specification (reproduced 
from [22]): 
Strong completeness: Eventually every process that 
crashes is permanently suspected by every correct process. 
Eventual strong accuracy: There is a time after which 
correct processes are not suspected by any correct process. 
Since we are interested in local failure detection – the 
detection of failures in a node’s immediate neighborhood 
– as opposed to global failure detection, we adapt the spec­
ification to reflect this. We denote this class of eventually 
perfect local failure detectors as }P‘. 
Strong local completeness: There is a time after which 
every process p that crashes is permanently suspected by 
every correct neighboring process q. 
Eventual strong local accuracy: There is a time after 
which correct processes are not suspected by any correct 
process in the neighborhood. Each process corrects its view 
of who its neighbors are periodically. 
Suspicion locality: There is a time after which correct 
processes only suspect processes that are in the local 
neighborhood. 
3. Detecting failure of neighboring nodes 
The failure detectors we present in this paper imple­
ment the bidirectional interface shown in Fig. 1. Applica­
tions may query a detector for the number of nodes that 
are suspected to have failed in a neighborhood (numSu­
spects()), or the suspected nodes (getSuspects()). 
Applications may also check if a particular node is alive 
or failed via the predicate isSuspect(p). In addition, 
for given suspect p, the failure detector can also report 
how long it has been since there was any communication 
from p, lastHeardFrom(p). Applications may use addi­
tional information to remove a node from the suspect list 
(removeSuspect()1.). In addition, the failure detector 
can notify applications when at least one neighbor, or no 
neighbor, is suspected. 
LeaseFD is the first, lease based, failure detector we 
present. This detector executes the algorithm depicted in 
Fig. 2 at every node u of the system. Similar to other TinyOS 
components, LeaseFD, is wired in to the application, and is 
provided with one parameter – the lease duration, which is 
best supplied by the application. Once started, the failure 
detector component periodically sends lease request mes­
sages to each neighbor. When a node p receives a lease re­
quest from a neighboring node q, the lease is recorded, and 
for the duration of the lease, the node q is not suspected. In 
case, q were already in the suspect list (wrongly sus­
pected), q is now removed the suspect list (mistake is 
corrected). 
As indicated above, a component that can provide a 
neighborhood abstraction is necessary to use LeaseFD. We  
implemented a simple beacon-based neighbor discovery 
protocol suitable for the failure detectors2 . Our neighbor 
discovery protocol establishes bi-directional neighborhood 
relations between nodes. 
4. Distinguishing node failure from link failure 
Consider the situation when a node p does not receive 
an ‘‘I am Alive” message from a neighbor q. It is not correct 
to assume that node q has failed because the communica­
tion link between p and q may have failed, while q contin­
ues to remain operational. If a link between two processes 
p and q failed, perhaps due to q moving out of the trans­
mission range of p, the failure detector at p should no long­
er keep track of q. 
1 We will demonstrate a use for this command in Section 4. 
2 A different neighborhood abstraction (e.g. Hood [34], abstract region 
[38]) can also be used. 
Fig. 1. The FailureDetector interface. 
Fig. 2. Lease-based failure detector algorithm. 
Why is this such a big deal? What is the problem with p 
continuing to suspect q? The reason is that if p suspects q 
to be failed, it is going to sacrifice local progress. However, 
in reality, q is still alive, but is no longer p’s neighbor. The 
correct way of dealing with this, is for p to distinguish be­
tween the process q failing, and the link between p and q 
failing. 
Consider Fig. 3. In both cases, the nodes inside the circle 
are in each other’s neighborhood. In the picture on the left 
side, node e has failed, and nodes c, d, and g recognize this 
failure using the eventually perfect ð}PÞ failure detector 
[22] and sacrifice their claim to the resource, thereby 
allowing nodes a and b to make progress. In the case on 
the right side of Fig. 3, there is no failure. Node e has simply 
moved out of range of c, d, and g. However, if the failure 
detector is based on message passing, the detector may 
suspect e to have failed. Accordingly, c, d, and g again go 
into the starve mode. This case, however, is unnecessary 
(and wrong), and is caused simply by virtue of the fact that 
the failure detector is not able to distinguish between a 
failure and mobility. 
In order to deal with this problem, we present our sec­
ond failure detector. This one is an implementation of the 
}Pm failure detector presented in [39]. An algorithm that ‘ 
this link failure detector implements is presented in 
Fig. 4. The MobilityAwareFD component implements this 
algorithm and this is executed at each node u, at a low 
rate. 
4.1. Implementing }Pm as MobilityAwareFD ‘ 
This section presents a brief sketch of design of the }Pm ‘ 
failure detector [39]. The algorithm is presented in Fig. 4. 
The basic idea of the }Pm failure detector is that a local ‘ 
failure detector that uses message exchanges in a one-
hop neighborhood alone cannot distinguish between a 
node that is failed in its neighborhood and one that has left 
its neighborhood. In order to make this distinction, the 
node uses the knowledge available in the rest of the net­
work. Periodically, some node in the network initiates a 
gossip diffusing computation [40] in the communication 
graph. In this message, the initiator node u sends out the 
list of nodes that are in its local suspect list ðSu Þ. For each 
suspect t in the suspect list, u also sends the duration of 
time for which t has been suspected. This is shown in lines 
2–7. Note that there is only one active gossip in the net­
work at any given time. At the time of deployment, some 
node is designated as the initiator. The initiator for subse­
quent rounds is nominated at the end of each round. 
Expanding phase. When a node w receives the gossip 
message for the first time, it examines the suspect group 
SG in the message, and performs two sets of actions to 
modify the suspect group. First, it checks to see if there is 
some process t that is a correct neighbor of w and yet is 
a member of SG. In this case, w determines that t has been 
(wrongly) suspected by some other process, and exonerates 
v (lines 12–15). This is shown in Fig. 5a. In the second set of 
actions, the process w adds to SG all the processes that it 
Fig. 3. Nodes unable to distinguish failure from mobility. 
Fig. 4. The }Pm algorithm that distinguishes node mobility from node failure. ‘ 
currently suspects (the contents of Sw) (lines 18–19). This Shrinking phase. Once the gossip message has reached 
is shown in Fig. 6. After the suspect group SG in the gossip the edge of the graph (leaf nodes have received the mes­
message has been modified, w sends this updated message sage), the gossip algorithm switches to the shrinking phase, 
to each of its neighbors (except the node from whence it where messages are sent back to the initiator. Each leaf 
received the gossip message; this node is w’s parent). This node, immediately upon updating SG and E, sends the up-
phase is called the expanding phase of gossip. During this dated gossip message back to its parent (line 25). When a 
phase, each process updates the suspect group SG and non-leaf node has received the gossip message back from 
the set of exonerated processes E based on local each of its children, it examines the exonerated set E and 
knowledge. if it finds some node t in this E that is also in Sw and/or 
Fig. 5. Process t is exonerated and u is restored to good state. 
Fig. 6. w adds t, which it suspects, to SG before propagating SG. 
Nw, w removes t from these sets (shown in Fig. 5b). The 
gossip message is then sent to the parent node. 
It is important to note that if a process w sees one of its 
neighbors t in the exonerated set E, w removes t from its 
neighborhood ðNwÞ. This prevents w from suspecting t 
again in the future. This situation is shown in Fig. 7. 
The algorithm presented here uses purely local knowl­
edge along with a limited amount of knowledge that the 
rest of the network shares in order to make (correct) deter­
minations of which nodes have actually failed and which 
nodes have simply moved out of communication range. 
The failure detector, while functioning like a global failure 
detector exhibits performance characteristics similar to a 
local failure detector. More details of this are presented in 
Section 5. 
4.2. Proof of correctness 
Here, we present a brief proof that the algorithm in the 
preceding section is indeed correct. The complete rigorous 
proof can be found in [39]. 
Claim 1.	 The mobility detection layer is guaranteed to ter­
minate. The core of the mobility detection layer 
is a terminating diffusing computation. The algo­
rithm does not add any new messages to this dif­
fusing computation, and as such, does not modify 
its termination property. 
Claim 2.	 No crashed node is removed from any suspect 
list incorrectly. There are only two places in sus­
pect sharing algorithm presented in Fig. 4 where 
a process x is removed from the suspect set Su 
(Line 30 and line 35). In the first case, the node 
x is removed because some other node in the net­
work (downstream in the gossip tree) exoner­
ated x. This means that x is no longer a 
neighbor, and is therefore removed from the 
neighborhood as well. In the second case, node 
x is indeed failed, but is being suspected by some 
other node that is further than two hops away. In 
this case as well, x is no longer a neighbor, and 
the removal from the suspect list is correct. 
Claim 3. No running node is suspected by the mobility 
detection layer. The function of adding nodes to 
a suspect list is performed by the local failure 
detection layer, and not by the mobility detec­
tion layer. Therefore this claim is trivially true. 
4.3. Case study example: resource allocation using dining 
philosophers 
Let us now consider an example to see the utility of our 
failure detection components in a WSAS. Consider a net­
work of nodes that use a dining philosophers scheme for 
distributed resource allocation. One popular algorithm for 
solving the dining philosophers problem is the hygienic 
algorithm proposed by Chandy and Misra [41]. This is a 
fork-based scheme; neighboring processes share forks, 
and the set of forks that a node p shares with its neighbors 
together represent a resource that the node wants to use. 
This means that if two neighbors share a fork, only one 
of them can be using the resource at any time. The nodes 
and the edges that represent forks comprise the conflict 
graph. 
The hygienic solution to dining philosophers is based on 
maintaining a partial order of priority among processes. 
That is, the edges of the conflict graph are given directions 
such that the graph is acyclic. A fork held by a neighbor 
who has higher priority in the partial order is said to be 
clean, while one held by a lower priority neighbor is said 
to be dirty. 
When two hungry processes compete for the same fork, 
the conflict is resolved in favor of the higher-priority pro­
cess. There is no deadlock because of the acyclicity of the 
partial order (a ‘‘waits-for” cycle cannot form among 
processes). 
Fig. 7. Process u discovers that although t is crashed, t is no longer a neighbor, and hence u can stay in good state. 
Fig. 8. Hygienic dining philosopher algorithm (adapted from [42]). 
There are two key parts to the hygienic solution. The 
first is that a higher priority hungry process never yields 
to a lower-priority neighbor (i.e., a hungry process never 
relinquishes a clean fork). The second is that after a process 
eats, it lowers its priority below that of all its neighbors. 
This operation preserves the acyclicity of the conflict 
graph. Together, these properties are sufficient to ensure 
that the liveness specification is met. For a complete proof 
of correctness of this algorithm, please refer to [41]. Fig. 8 
shows the pseudocode for the hygienic algorithm. 
While this algorithm is extremely simple to understand 
and implement, and performs well with respect to mes­
sage complexity and response time, its failure locality3 is 
poor. In fact, it is as bad as it can get! The failure locality 
of the hygienic algorithm is d, the diameter of the conflict 
graph. This means that a single node that fails while holding 
its forks will bring the entire network to a halt. As an illustra­
tion, consider Fig. 9. In  Fig. 9a, node a has failed while hold­
ing the fork that it shares with node b. Nodes c and d are 
higher priority than b, which is hungry. While c and d will 
not yield immediately when b requests their forks, eventu­
ally they will eat and will reduce their priorities below that 
of b. Therefore, b will collect and hold on to those forks. 
However, it will never get the fork that a is holding, since 
a is failed. Since b is still hungry, and is higher in priority 
than c and d, b will not yield to c or d. Meanwhile, e becomes 
hungry and is waiting on d’s fork. Thus, a single failure has 
caused the entire network to halt, as shown in Fig. 9(b). 
In [42], Pike and Sivilotti propose a transformation of 
the hygienic algorithm to reduce the failure locality to 1 
(Fig. 10). The strategy is as follows. When a node p in the 
network suspects that one of its neighbors (say, q) is failed, 
it enters a special state in which it honors all fork requests, 
regardless of the priority of the requesting node. In this 
manner, p shields the rest of the network from q’s failure; 
only q’s immediate neighbors in the conflict graph are af­
fected by this failure. 
If the network topology is static, we could implement 
this transformation using the LeaseFD component. The 
A measure of the impact of a fault in a single node on the rest of a 
distributed system. 
failure detector can keep track of each node’s neighbor­
hood, and allow the dining algorithm to make progress. 
When a node q fails, it will fail to renew its lease with its 
neighbor p. When p checks to see if all of its neighbors have 
renewed their leases, it will see that q has not, and will sus­
pect q. Consequently, it will set its state to be skeptical. A  
node in the skeptical state will always yield forks to other 
neighbors (Fig. 10). Therefore, the failure locality is re­
duced to 1. 
However, consider that the network’s topology is dy­
namic, and nodes in the network may move around. In this 
case, the LeaseFD failure detector cannot distinguish be­
tween a node that is failed and one that has moved away 
from range. Consider Fig. 11a for example. In this picture, 
solid lines denote active links, while dotted lines represent 
that the two nodes were neighbors at some point in the 
past. The node a is a mobile node, and it moved around in 
the network. After a while, nodes b, c, and d are all starving, 
thinking that a is one of their failed neighbors (see Fig. 12). 
Now consider the same transformation (Fig. 10), this 
time using the MobilityAwareFD failure detector compo­
nent. This component can distinguish node failure from 
node mobility. Nodes b, c, and d will suspect a to be failed, 
but eventually (after the suspect group has been gossiped 
around), they return back to normal state; node e exoner­
ates a. 
5. Evaluation of performance overhead 
The experimental evaluation of our failure detection 
middleware was conducted on the NESTbed Tmote Sky 
testbed at Clemson University [43]. The testbed has 80 
Tmote Sky nodes arranged in a 16 x 5 grid. Even though 
the physical separation between the motes is only about 
one foot, the radios on the motes are set to transmit at a 
low enough power level so as to form multi-hop network 
topologies. 
We ran several experiments on the testbed to measure 
the quality of service provided by our failure detection 
components. We measure these metrics for both the com­
ponents presented here – LeaseFD (static topologies) and 
MobilityAwareFD (dynamic topologies). All of the experi­
ments ran on the entire testbed. Each run of the experi­
ment lasted 10 min. Each experiment was run multiple 
times, and the results were averaged to account for 
anomalies. 
5.1. Message complexity 
The first set of experiments here measure the message 
complexity of our two failure detection components. The 
message overhead of the }Pm failure detector is the sum ‘ 
of the overhead introduced by the local failure detector, 
and the overhead of gossip. Consider a WSAS with n nodes, 
e links between nodes, and maximum number of neighbors 
of a node d. As is common with typical WSAN applications, 
d « n. 
In the lease-based local failure detector, each node peri­
odically sends out one lease message to each of its neigh­
bors. If we assume that the lease durations of all nodes 
3 
Fig. 9. Hygienic dining philosophers; failure locality is diameter of graph ðdÞ. 
Fig. 10. Hygienic dining philosopher algorithm, transformed to tolerate 
crashes (adapted from [42]). 
are roughly the same, then the total number of messages 
sent out in the entire network is Oðn · dÞ for each round 
of leases. 
The message complexity of gossip is Oðn · eÞ. Each node 
participates in propagating the message out to the edge of 
the graph, and then propagating the message back to the 
initiator in the shrinking phase. 
Supposing that there were l rounds of lease messages 
exchanged among neighbors for each round of gossip in 
}Pm , the message overhead in the WSAS is‘ 
Oðn · e þ l · n · dÞ. The additional overhead introduced by 
gossip is much smaller than the overhead introduced by 
the local failure detector alone. 
For each component, we measured both the overall load 
on the entire network (total number of additional mes­
sages sent by all nodes in the network), as well as the aver­
age number of additional messages sent by each node. The 
average number of neighbors (average degree) for each 
node in the network is 6.7. Given this, the measurement 
of average number of extra message traffic introduced by 
the LeaseFD component is consistent with the analytical 
prediction of Oðn · dÞ for each round of lease messages ex­
changed. Fig. 13a shows the average number of messages 
sent out by LeaseFD per round of leases at each node in 
the network, for various values of lease durations. 
The second part of the message complexity experiments 
measure the additional message overhead introduced by 
the MobilityAwareFD component, when running in conjunc­
tion with the LeaseFD local failure detector. Again, we mea­
sure this for different values of gossip durations (rate at 
which the suspect sharing algorithm is initiated). Fig. 13b 
shows the average message overhead introduced by the 
MobilityAwareFD component. 
5.1.1. Speed of failure detection 
The speed of failure detection depends on the speed of 
the local failure detection module (lease in our case). If a 
node p does not renew its lease with a neighbor q, then q 
will suspect p when it checks to see if p renewed its lease. 
In the worst case, p fails the instant after it sends out a 
lease renewal request. q will detect this failure once the 
p’s lease expires. So if the average lease duration is ld, 
and the rate at which each process checks on its neighbors 
is sd, then the speed of failure detection is Oðld þ sdÞ. 
Our second set of experiments measure how quickly a 
failure is detected. We measured this on both of our com­
ponents, LeaseFD and MobilityAwareFD. Since the speed of 
failure detection is a function of the local failure detector 
alone, in this case LeaseFD, we only evaluate this compo­
nent. Fig. 14a shows the speed of failure detection for the 
LeaseFD component for varying values of lease duration 
ðldÞ and suspect duration ðsdÞ. Fig. 14(b) confirms that gos­
sip duration has no effect on the speed of failure detection. 
Fig. 11. The MobilityAwareFD component reduces the failure locality of hygienic dining philosophers to 1 in networks that allow node mobility. 
Fig. 12. Experimental setup: The Tmote Sky testbed at Clemson University. 
5.1.2. Mistake duration 
The }Pm detector at process p learns of mistakes it may ‘ 
have made when it sees that some process q that is sus­
pected has been exonerated by someone else in the net­
work. For such exoneration to happen, a round of gossip 
needs to be executed. At the end of each round of gossip, 
any mistakes that any node made will be corrected. There­
fore, the mistake duration of }Pm is Oðn · e · DmÞ if Dm is the ‘ 
average message transmission delay between two nodes. 
The next metric we measure by experimentation is the 
mistake duration of our components – the time taken by 
the failure detector to correct a mistake. This is a function 
of how often the suspect sharing algorithm executes (gos­
sip duration, qg and how long it takes for a round of the 
gossip to terminate. Fig. 15b shows the mistake duration 
of the MobilityAwareFD component for different values of 
gossip duration. The local failure detector does not have 
an impact on this metric. Fig. 15a confirms this: the results 
do not vary much with different values of lease duration or 
suspect duration. 
5.1.3. Mistake recurrence time 
The mistake recurrence time of a failure detector mea­
sures the time between two consecutive mistakes that 
Fig. 13. Message complexity of LeaseFD and MobilityAwareFD components. 
Fig. 14. Speed of detection. 
Fig. 15. Mistake duration of }Pm implementation. This measures how quickly a wrongly-suspected node is exonerated, and the suspecter is returned to ‘ 
good state. 
the detector makes. This metric is a function only of the lo- and lease duration. Fig. 16a shows the mistake recurrence 
cal failure detector, in the case of the LeaseFD detector, de- time for different values of lease duration. Fig. 16b shows 
pends on the relationship between the suspect duration the mistake recurrence times for different values of gossip 
Fig. 16. Mistake recurrence time. 
Fig. 17. Events detected in the network. 
Fig. 18. Memory footprint for telosb node running }Pm .‘ 
duration, and confirms that the suspect sharing part has no 
essential effect on this metric. 
5.1.4. Mistake rate 
Next, we measured the actual rate of mistakes in the 
system. We also measured how often a single mistake is 
repeated by a given node. Fig. 17a shows the comparison 
of events detected as a function of lease duration in net­
works with node crashes, and without. It also shows the 
number of repeat mistakes in these different scenarios. No­
tice how the rate of mistakes decreases with increasing 
lease duration. This metric is also a function only of the lo­
cal failure detector, and the gossip algorithm does not have 
an effect. Fig. 17b confirms this. 
5.1.5. Memory overhead 
Finally, we measured the memory overhead that is 
introduced by the failure detection components we have 
presented in this paper. We measured this in the context 
of the case study example of hygienic dining philosophers 
with and without failure detection. Fig. 18 shows the com­
parison in RAM and ROM usage for the hygienic dining 
implementation in TinyOS with and without the failure 
detection components. 
The memory overhead introduced by the failure detec­
tion components is not dependent on the underlying appli­
cation. The increase in ROM is caused by the additional 
code introduced. The increase in RAM is in account of the 
state that the failure detection components have to 
maintain in order to function. This state size is determined 
by the size of the local neighborhood of nodes in the net­
work. This size is currently set statically, based on design 
parameters. An approach recently presented in [44] can 
be used to optimize the size of neighborhood sets based 
on network observation at run-time. Such optimization 
can control the memory overhead to what is actually nec­
essary for the given configuration. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we presented two failure detectors for 
WSAS. Since individual nodes in a sensor network deploy­
ment are frequently of very low cost, and are hence dis­
pensable, failure considerations are elevated to a first-
class level in the design of software for such systems. As 
a consequence, the ability to detect when failures occur, 
and react to such failures in the most reasonable manner 
is important. The components presented in this paper 
implement efficient solutions to detecting failures. 
The failure detectors can be considered as a middleware 
service and include a way of distinguishing between node 
failures and link failures. We use this quality of the service 
in tolerating mobility of nodes in the network, and yet pro­
viding consistent failure localization when faults do occur. 
We have presented implementations of our middleware 
service components in a readily usable form – the compo­
nents themselves are completely self-contained, and pro­
vide an easy-to-use interface that applications can wire to. 
Finally, as an aid to developers wishing to use these 
components, we have provided experimental measure­
ments of the overheads and costs associated with using 
the middleware service. These measurements will allow 
developers to be able to make predictions of performance 
of their own applications while used in conjunction with 
the failure detection middleware. 
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